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Most sports are interesting because the outcome of a game can not be predicted
perfectly in advance. Indeed, sometimes sports organizations try to maximize
the uncertainty associated with outcomes of games by restricting the behaviour
of teams and players so as to maximize public interest. The degree of compet-
itiveness in a league is also known as competitive balance. In this paper we
propose a very simple model to analyze the outcome of soccer matches. The
parameters of this model are used to assess whether the competitive balance in
Dutch professional soccer has decreased or increased over time.
Keywords: professional soccer, ordered probit model, competitive balance.1 Introduction
Professional soccer is big business nowadays. Broadcasting rights for 4 years
have been sold in England for approximately US $ 1 billion, a typical sponsor
contract for a European top team is valued at US $ 6 million (yearly), and
the annual salary of a top striker is rumored to be US $ 6 million. Demand
as measured by attendance in stadiums or number of spectators watching live
broadcasts has increased as well during the last years. In other words, the soccer
business is becoming a major amusement industry (Economist (1997)).
One of the reasons for interest in a particular soccer game, or in any sports
contest, is that the outcome of that game is uncertain. Big teams tend to
win their games but sometimes they are taken by surprise by a lesser team.
Most soccer acionados can recall stories about a leader in the league who lost
unexpectedly against a team that was in the bottom of the league. In fact,
soccer results are very random in the sense that only a few goals are scored each
game and hence chance may be rather inﬂuential in determining the outcome
of a game.
One would expect that interest in soccer will decline if balance between
teams would become more uneven, ie., if the outcome of games would become
less uncertain. Especially `smaller' teams are afraid that an increasing inequal-
ity of the income distribution of clubs leads to a decrease of the odds of beating
`big' teams. Because of valuable sponsor contracts, proceeds from the lucra-
tive Champions League competition, merchandising, and television rights the
wealthy teams are able to lure players away from the smaller teams|even for
the bench. Smaller teams used to receive revenues from transferring players
with great talents to top teams, but this source of income has vanished after
the Bosman-ruling1. This income could be used to improve training facilities for
smaller teams, or to increase the quality of the team by hiring players. Increased
European demand for top players has sent salaries sky high with evident reper-
cussions for the salary demands by mediocre players at average teams. These
developments may cause a breakdown in competitive balance between teams and
hence, may decrease interest in soccer in the long run. Some smaller teams use
these arguments to call for a redistribution the proceeds of the sale of television
rights (both of the national competition and of the Champions League).
In this paper we will examine the development of competitive balance in
Dutch professional soccer. Our aims are modest: we will measure competitive
balance in a few dierent ways, and we will discuss its development over time.
The commercialization of soccer is of recent date and we do not want to assess
these developments yet. However, using the results in this paper they can be put
into perspective. The setup of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses some
relevant American literature on competitive balance. In section 3 we develop a
simple statistical model that can be used to analyze soccer results. Competitive
balance and its evolution over time is discussed in section 4. We end with
conclusions and directions for further research in section 5.
1The Bosman-ruling by the European Court of Justice basically states that a soccer player
from with the European Community are free agents after his contract expires.
12 Competitive Balance: Theory
In general, sport contests are seen as interesting only if the dierence in quality
between the contenders is limited. As Quirk and Fort (1992) put it:
One of the key ingredients of the demand by fans for team sports
is the excitement generated because of uncertainty of outcome of
league games ...In order to maintain fan interest, a sports league
has to ensure that teams do not get too strong or too weak relative
to one another so that uncertainty of outcome is preserved. [p. 243]
In fact, this is cited as the reason why some sport organizations in the US are
exempted from anti-trust regulation. Two teams engage in joint production
when they play a game. The outcome and the quality of the game is the good
sold to the public. The public is worse o when the outcome of a game is known
in advance than if the game is tight, and hence collusion between teams so as
to increase the quality of the game may be in the public's interest. According
to this view, an important task for sport bodies like the UEFA (European
soccer organization) or KNVB (the Dutch soccer association) is to maintain
competitive balance because this is needed to ensure long-term interest in the
league. The instruments available to achieve competitive balance are limited,
though. In The Netherlands, a court has decided in a preliminary ruling that the
individual teams are the owners of the broadcasting rights, not the organizing
body. Hence, each team can sell its broadcasting rights individually and take
the proceeds of this transaction. An implicit subsidy from wealthy teams to
poorer teams by the organizing body (in order to maintain competitive balance)
is no longer possible. Moreover, contrary to baseball and football in the US,
gate receipts are not split between both teams. This may favor teams with big
stadiums, even though a complete competition is played (each pair of teams
meet twice, once in each venue). Moreover, note that in European soccer there
are no salary caps, either for the teams as a total or for individual contracts.
Competitive balance and regulations that improve or deteriorate competitive
balance have been studied before, though|as far as the author knows|not in
the context of European soccer. Denitions of competitive balance vary between
the authors, or are not given at all. We give a short review of the (all American)
literature.
Neumann and Tamura (1996) examine competitive balance in National Foot-
ball League. More precisely, they focus on the organization and regulation of
the NFL and they examine how competitive balance responds to shocks to the
market. They measure team quality as parameters in a nonlinear regression
model. Estimation of the parameters is not trivial, because the NFL-schedule
is incomplete, that is, not every team plays against every other team, and the
schedule in year t depends on the outcomes of the competition in year t − 1.
Competitive balance itself is measured by the dispersion of the estimated qual-
ity parameters. We will pursue a similar route, ie., we will measure competitive
balance by the spread of quality parameters of the teams that participate in the
league.
2Bennett and Fizel (1995) examine the eect of telecast deregulation on com-
petitive balance in college football. In a ruling in 1984 the supreme court as-
signed the right to sell broadcasting rights to the individual schools, while the
right was held previously by the NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion). Popular opinion held that this ruling would decrease competitive balance
in the competitions, as the successful schools would be able to attract more
and better talents because of more television exposure. They nd, however,
that competitive balance has increased after the ruling. Competitive balance
is measured by comparing actual performance in a league to the performance
that would obtain if all teams are of equal strength (this approach is due to Noll
(1991) and Scully (1989)). Moreover, the performances of the best and worse
teams are followed over time. The fact that a team doing well in year t does
less well in year t + 1 (and the opposite for a team that does not perform well)
is seen as evidence of competitive balance.
The eect of the rookie draft on competitive balance is discussed in Grier and
Tollison (1994). The rookie draft is supposed to increase competitive balance
because the order of a team in the draft is inversely related to its performance
in the previous year. The worst teams get the best pick. The ndings of Grier
and Tollison corroborate this point view: the win percentage in a given year is
inversely related to the draft order in the previous year. Grier and Tollison do
not give an explicit denition of competitive balance but they seem to suggest
that perfect competitive balance obtains if the winning percentage of a football
team is 50%.
Competitive balance is also discussed in Vrooman (1995). He discusses the
reasons for the salary-explosion of baseball players. He distinguishes between
competitive balance, which is dened as the relative quality of play among
teams and the production of overall league talent, which is dened as the ab-
solute quality of the game. In a theoretical model he derives that complete
competitive balance implies maximum league product if and only if talent is
team independent. Hence, relative and absolute quality must be traded against
each other if some teams have a unique playing style that makes some players
perform well and other players not. As far as competitive balance is concerned,
he distinguishes between three interrelated issues: dominance of large market
clubs, closeness of the league within a season, and continuity of performance
over time. Continuity of performance over time is measured by estimating an
autoregressive model for the winning percentage and Vrooman interprets a de-
creasing AR-coecient over time as evidence of increasing competitive balance
because exceptional results (a high winning percentage) is not maintained over
time.
Finally we mention the results published in Quirk and Fort (1992). They
measure long-term development of competitive balance in ve American profes-
sional sport leagues: American League (baseball), National League (baseball),
NBA (basketball), NHL (hockey), and the NFL (American football). They mea-
sure competitive balance by comparing the win/loss percentage for each league
for each year with the win/loss percentage one would expect to nd if all teams
were equally strong. Each of the ve leagues that they analyze shows signicant
3imbalance, though the imbalance in both baseball leagues has been decreasing
during the last 20 or 30 years. They also examine the eect of the introduction
of competitive labor markets in baseball and basketball. In accordance with a
microeconomic model they do not nd any changes in competitive balance.
In soccer, a game ends after 90 minutes of play and if the score is tied, no
additional time is played in order to determine a winning team. This is contrary
to, for instance, US baseball and basketball. As a matter of fact, draws are quite
prevalent in Dutch soccer, over the 1956/57-1996/97 period 26% of all league
games ended in a draw, 48% ended in a win of the home team and the remaining
26% ended in a win for the away team. We dene a soccer league to be in perfect
competitive balance for a certain year if the probability that a team wins a home
game is constant, ie., it does not vary with the oponent. This denition implies
that a competition in which all games are won by the team that plays at home,
is perfectly balances, just like a competition where all games end in a draw.
This denition allows for home advantage that may change over time, while the
league is still in complete balance. Because draws occur rather often in soccer
game, this denition is not equivalent to the one where complete competitive
balance obtains if the winning percentage is 50% for all teams.
It is by no means clear that achieving perfect competitive balance is opti-
mal from a welfare point of view. If many people associate themselves with a
particular team, and only a few with another team, more people will be happy
if the rst team wins. Optimal competitive balance can only be derived in a
framework of interpersonal welfare comparisons, and we will not discuss that in
this paper.
3 A Model to Analyze Soccer Results
3.1 The Statistical Model
In this section we propose a simple statistical model to analyze the outcome
of soccer games. The model is a straightforward extension of the model of
Neumann and Tamura (1996) in that we allow explicitly for an advantage for
the home team. The strength of team i in the league is measured by a single
parameter i. This parameter is independent of the opponent and venue of
the game, and assumed to be constant during the season. If we assume that
team i plays at home and team j is the away team, the dierence in strength
is i − j. To allow for unmeasured characteristics (ie., not measured with ),
chance events during a game that inﬂuence the score, etc., we assume that the
outcome of the game is determined by the random variable D
ij:
D
ij = i − j + "ij: (1)
If D
ij is positive, team i is stronger than j and the opposite if D
ij is negative.
We do not observe the actual dierence in strength, but we observe the outcome
of the game instead. In fact, we observe whether team i has won, has played a
draw, or lost against team j. Moreover, we observe the number of goals scored
by each side but we do not use that information at this moment. The latent












with Dij =1i ft e a miwins, Dij =0i ft e a miplays a draw, and Dij = −1i f
team j that plays away wins the game. If we assume that the stochastic terms
"ij in equation (1) are independent normal distributed ("ij N (0;2)), then
the probabilities of the possible outcomes of a game are:
Pr(Dij =1 )=1−((c2 − i + j)=)
Pr(Dij = 0) = ((c2 − i + j)=) − ((c1 − i + j)=)
Pr(Dij = −1) = ((c1 − i + j)=)
with () the standard normal distribution function.
The statistical model in equation (2) allows for a home advantage. Consider
two (hypothetical) teams of equal strength so that i−j = 0. The probability
that the home team wins is 1−(c2=) and the probability that the home team
loses is (c1=). These two probabilities are not constrained to be equal, in
fact one would expect that (c1=) < 1−(c2=) and this will be found in our
estimates later on.
Of course it is not possible to identify all parameters in this model. First,
we need to x the location of the quality parameters . We impose the iden-
tifying restriction
P
i i = 0 so that the parameters  can be interpreted as
deviations from a hypothetical average team with quality 0. A positive i im-
plies that quality of team i is better than average, a negative i implies the
opposite. Furthermore, we x the scale of the model by imposing the standard
normalization 2 =1 .
The model is based on the outcome of games only, not on the exact nal
score. Alternative approaches could be based on Poisson-like models for the
exact score in a game, see for instance Maher (1982), Dixon and Coles (1997)and
Dixon and Robinson (1997). The reason that we prefer the ordered probit model
is the simplicity of model (2): the quality of each individual team is captured by
a single parameter. Poisson-like models are usually more complex and have more
parameters. For instance, in Maher (1982) at least two parameters per team
have to be estimated and these parameters do not have a ready interpretation.
Moreover, Mahers assumes that the number of goals scored by the home team
and the away team are statistically independent and it is not clear whether this
is a reasonable assumption. In the estimation we will assume that games are
mutually independent. This assumption is made in most Poisson models as well.
It seems easier to allow for dynamics in model (2) than in Poisson-like models.
For these reasons we use the simple model (2).
53.2 Data Description and Estimation Results
The parameters were estimated using the complete history of the premier league
of professional soccer in The Netherlands2. Organization of the competition as
we know it nowadays was introduced in the season 1955/56. In the seasons
1962/63, 1963/64, 1964/65, and 1965/66 only sixteen teams participated in
the premier league, in all other seasons eighteen teams participated. Rules
for relegation to the rst division have changed over time, during the last few
seasons the team ending last was relegated instantaneously to the rst division
while the numbers 16 and 17 had to play additional games against teams of the
rst division. In earlier seasons though, the teams ending at 17th and 18th place
were relegated without having to play additional games. In total, 54 dierent
clubs have played in the premier league since start of the competition in 1955/56.
Each year a couple of new teams entered the competition, either because of
mergers3 or because of promotion. In each competition any combination of two
teams meet twice: once at each venue. Hence, a competition with 18 teams
consists of 306 games; in total the dataset comprises 12155 games. Only 179
games of the 1996/97 season were played when this research was started.
First, we estimated the parameters , c1,a n dc 2assuming that they have
been constant during the history of professional soccer. The parameters were







I(Dij=1) ln(1 − (c2 − i + j))
+I(Dij=0) ln((c2 − i + j) − (c1 − i + j))
+I(Dij=−1) ln(c1 − i + j)

: (3)
Here,  is the index indicating the season and I is the index set of teams play-
ing in the premier league in season . The point estimates and their standard
errors are given in table 5 in Appendix A. The ordering of the parameters 
indicates an all-time ranking. The best three teams have been Ajax (0.963),
Feyenoord (0.750), and PSV (0.735), and the teams performing least well have
been Dordrecht (−0:581), Fortuna SC (−0:498), and SVV (−0:433). This rank-
ing is not necessarily equal to the usual historical one when two or three points
are awarded for each game won and one for a draw. Teams that are relegated
during some seasons do not earn any points in this ranking and hence, they will
be in the bottom of that ranking. In our approach there are no observations
on a team if it does not participate in the premier league during some season.
Hence, the estimated  of a team that has participated in the premier league for
two seasons only can exceed the estimated  of a team that has played in the
premier league for many seasons, if that rst team played well during these two
seasons. Indeed, we nd that the teams with least points are not those with the
smallest 's: these are Fortuna SC (21 points), SHS (25), and Alkmaar (30).
2T h ed a t aw e r eo b t a i n e df r o mhttp://www.noord.bart.nl/~kammenga/soccer and from
Michael Koolhaas.
3A list of all relevant mergers is given in Appendix A.
6Figure 1: Home advantage: probability that home or visiting team wins if both
teams are of equal strength
Secondly, we estimated the parameters for each year. This approach allows
for variation of team-specic quality over time. Here we present estimates of the
home advantage, see gure 1, detailed information on the individual estimates
for each year are available on request. Home advantage is measured as the
probability that the home team wins if both teams are of equal quality (ie.,
i = j). The solid line depicts the probability that the home team wins and the
dashed line the probability that the away team wins. If there would be no home
advantage both lines would coincide (apart from sample variation). However, we
see that there is a clear home advantage which has increased markedly during
the second half of the sixties. Since the early seventies, the probability that
the home team wins against an opponent of equal strength is approximately
45%-50%. The corresponding probability for the away team appears to have
increased since then from approximately 15% to 20%. A test whether c1 = c2
is rejected at any reasonable level of signicance for all years.
In table 1 we present some summary statistics of the estimation results for
each year. For each season we list the strongest and the weakest teams, and the
standard deviation of the estimated 's. Instead of giving the point estimates
for the -parameters, which are dicult to interpret, we give a transformation
of these estimates. If a team has quality  in a given year, then the probability
that this team wins against the hypothetical team with quality 0 is 1−(−c2).
7year worst team (1) best team (n) st. dev.
1956 eindhove 0:259 ajax 0:714 0:320
1957 den bosc 0:260 sc ensch 0:679 0:273
1958 shs 0:212 sparta 0:755 0:412
1959 sittardi 0:196 ajax 0:735 0:363
1960 noad 0:212 feyenoor 0:776 0:386
1961 rapid jc 0:263 feyenoor 0:730 0:308
1962 volewijc 0:112 psv 0:700 0:399
1963 blauw-wi 0:265 dws 0:706 0:362
1964 nac 0:335 feyenoor 0:747 0:270
1965 heracles 0:297 ajax 0:867 0:466
1966 willem i 0:143 ajax 0:863 0:537
1967 sittardi 0:212 ajax 0:898 0:529
1968 fortunsc 0:175 feyenoor 0:894 0:628
1969 svv 0:144 ajax 0:918 0:600
1970 az 0:128 feyenoor 0:904 0:739
1971 volendam 0:168 ajax 0:959 0:725
1972 den bosc 0:179 ajax 0:931 0:678
1973 groninge 0:233 feyenoor 0:865 0:595
1974 wagening 0:261 psv 0:852 0:520
1975 excelsio 0:216 psv 0:810 0:501
1976 de graaf 0:273 ajax 0:794 0:429
1977 telstar 0:165 psv 0:795 0:443
1978 vvv 0:134 ajax 0:841 0:539
1979 haarlem 0:323 ajax 0:749 0:352
1980 wagening 0:257 az 0:888 0:486
1981 de graaf 0:122 ajax 0:852 0:552
1982 nec 0:259 ajax 0:887 0:514
1983 ds79 0:163 feyenoor 0:860 0:560
1984 pec zwol 0:200 ajax 0:813 0:446
1985 heracles 0:123 psv 0:896 0:550
1986 excelsio 0:223 psv 0:894 0:484
1987 ds79 0:138 psv 0:877 0:476
1988 veendam 0:306 psv 0:808 0:370
1989 haarlem 0:167 ajax 0:736 0:403
1990 nec 0:292 psv 0:812 0:440
1991 vvv 0:120 psv 0:875 0:576
1992 fortunsc 0:252 feyenoor 0:792 0:467
1993 cambuur 0:233 ajax 0:820 0:409
1994 dordrech 0:238 ajax 0:914 0:556
1995 go ahead 0:197 ajax 0:872 0:550
1996 az 0:237 psv 0:795 0:422
Table 1: best and worst team for each year
8This probability is given in the third and fth column of table 1, where we took
c2 =0 : 060, the value obtained when estimating the model for the whole sample
period. Hence, the variation in the probabilities reﬂect quality variation, not
changes in home advantage.
Note that the ML-estimate for an  would diverge to −1 if a team loses
all games during a season or +1 if a team wins all games. No such teams are
found even though Ajax came close in the 1971/72 season by losing one game,
playing a draw in a mere 3 games, and winning all other games.
3.3 Specification Tests
The model of the previous sections is estimated using maximum likelihood.
The parameters are estimated inconsistently if the distributional assumption of
normality is not correct. We tested whether we should reject the assumption of
normality against the more general alternative that the distribution of the error
terms belong to a member of the Pearson-family of distributions. Members of
the Pearson-family include the normal, t-, and Γ-distribution. The calculation
of the appropriate critical values is discussed in Appendix D. The test basically
tests whether the third moment of " is 0 and the fourth moment of " is 3.
The test statistic was calculated for each year the model was estimated and
the null-hypothesis of normality was not rejected in any season at a 5% level of
signicance.
We tried to simplify the model by imposing restrictions on the parameters.
First, for each year all estimated 's are jointly signicantly dierent from 0.
Second, the hypothesis that home advantage is constant over time had to be
rejected, just like the hypothesis that the quality of a given team does not vary
over time.
If one is willing to assume that the quality parameters i remain constant
over time, it is possible to test for variation of the variance of the error term
in (2). We imposed this restriction, and re-estimated the model for the period
1991/91-1996/97 with unrestricted variances, except for one year. We could not
reject the null hypothesis that the variance of " is constant over time.
4 Competitive Balance: Empirical Evidence
Many numerical measures for competitive balance can be proposed. One can
use the analogy between the income distribution and the quality distribution
as measured in the previous section. All the usual measures that are used to
quantify changes in the income distribution (Gini-coecient, Theil-coecient,
Lorenz-curve) can be used to assess whether the distribution of quality has
become more unequal over time or not. A problem though may be that the
estimates of our model are centered around zero and that there is no `natural'
lower or upper bound to the estimated 's.
In this paper we measure competitive balance in ve dierent ways:
1. The standard deviation P of the number of points in the nal ranking of
a competition. If this number is small, there is not much spread in points
9gained at the end of the season and the competition has been tight.
2. Since i is the extent to which team i is better than a hypothetical team
with quality 0, it seems natural to measure competitive balance by the
total deviation from average quality,
P
i 2
i. This is proportional to the
standard deviation  of the quality parameters of the statistical model of
the previous section. Again, if this number is small, quality of the teams
does not vary by much.
3. The concentration ratio CRK which is dened as the number of points
obtained by the top K teams divided by the number of points they could
have gained. If there are J teams in a competition the team winning
the competition could have obtained 2W(J − 1) points where W is the





KW(2J − K − 1)
: (4)
4. A matrix with transition probabilities , which is dened as a matrix with
the probability that a team that ends in state i in season t ends in state
j in year t + 1. We assume that there are seven relevant states: ending
between the rst and third place, ending between the fourth and sixth,
etc. The nal state is relegation/promotion. Our time series consists of 39
seasons with 18 teams in the premier league and 3 seasons with 16 teams
in the league which gives us 798 observations.
5. Finally, we measure competitive balance over time by examining the per-
sistence of the quality parameters  over time. If a team has a high  in
one particular year, is it likely to have a high  in the succeeding year?
The rst three measures are to some extent `static' as they refer to competi-
tive balance within a particular season. An advantage of the second measure
compared to the rst measure is that it does not require data on a completed
season only. The concentration ratio is not a measure of balance in the whole
competition, it applies to the quality of the top teams only. This measure is
interesting though because common believe has it that the gap between top
teams and the rest has increased over time. In this sense it answers a dierent
question than the rst two measures. The last two measures are dynamic as it
measures persistence of quality dierences between consecutive seasons.
First, we measure competitive balance in a very simple manner: by means
of the standard deviation of the number of points and the standard deviation of
the estimated 's (if each team would be equally good, all 's would be the same
and the standard deviation would be 0). These measures are not completely
equivalent: in the season 95/96 the number of points obtained by a win was
raised from 2 to 3. Contrary to the standard deviation of the number of points,
the standard deviation of the 's is invariant to changes in the number of points
10Figure 2: standard deviation of the number of points (top panel) and standard
deviation of the estimated 's (bottom panel)
11awarded for a win or a draw. Moreover, we can estimate the 's and their
standard deviation even if a season is not nished completely. The results are
graphed in gure 2. The standard deviation of the 's varies between 0.25 and
0.75 but it is dicult to interpret the absolute level of variation. The general
impression from this graph is interesting, though.
Competitive balance didn't change systematically from the early start of
professional soccer in 1955 until the mid sixties. Then we see a marked increase
in inequality between 1965 and 1970 followed by an increase in competitive
balance between 1970 and 1976. Coincidentally (or not) it was in the period
1966-1970 that Dutch professional soccer caught up with the best teams in
Europe. Ajax was the rst Dutch nalist in a European tournament in the
spring of 19694, Feyenoord was the rst Dutch winner in a European tournament
in 19705. Dutch (and European) soccer was dominated by Ajax from 1970 until
1973, a period when competitive balance in Dutch soccer increased sharply.
As from the mid-seventies there is no clear trend in competitive balance.
One year competition is tighter than another year, but trends are lacking. The
spread from year to year is considerable, years with a tight competition are
followed by years with a boring one. This fact is especially noteworthy because
it was feared in the early eighties that competition would become less tight be-
cause of shirt sponsoring. Shirt sponsoring in Dutch soccer has been allowed
from the season 1981/82 onwards. At rst, it seemed that criticism of shirt
sponsoring was justied, since in the season 1981/82 two teams were unable to
nd a sponsor at all. This was only a temporary phenomena, though: even
amateur-teams have shirt sponsoring nowadays. The fact that some teams had
better sponsoring deals than other teams resulted in a more unequal distribu-
tion of income of the teams. This bigger income inequality supposedly led to
a decrease of comeptitive balance, but we do not nd any evidence for this
hypothesis. Smaller teams use the same arguments these days to oppose tele-
vision contracts that give large teams more proceeds than smaller teams using
the same arguments as they did when they opposed shirt sponsoring: an un-
equal distribution of television revenues will lead to an unequal distribution of
quality and this leads to a decrease of general interest in soccer. However, com-
petitive balance has not decreased signicantly since the introduction of shirt
sponsoring. In fact, shirt sponsoring has enabled most semi-professional players
to become full-professionals and this may have increased the overall quality of
soccer.
As a third indicator of competitive balance, we look at the concentration
ratios for the rst- and fourth place. The results are drawn in gure 3.
Qualitatively we see the same picture emerge as from the previous graphs:
until the mid-sixties the top teams grabbed only 75% of the number of points the
could have obtained at the end of the season, and the this percentage increases
during the second half if the sixties, to a maximum of 94% for the top team in
1971/72 (the champions of that year obtained 63 points and they would have
4Final Europacup I, may 1969: AC Milan-Ajax 4-1.
5Final Europacup I, 6 may 1970 Feyenoord-Celtic 2-1 (after extra time).
12Figure 3: concentration ratio, rst and fourth place
131 − 34 − 67 − 91 0 − 12 13 − 15 16 − 18 P/R
1 − 30 : 683 0:208 0:050 0:025 0:017 0:008 0:008
4 − 60 : 175 0:350 0:233 0:125 0:092 0:017 0:008
7 − 90 : 075 0:200 0:192 0:242 0:175 0:100 0:017
10 − 12 0:042 0:100 0:225 0:225 0:233 0:158 0:017
13 − 15 0:008 0:100 0:142 0:175 0:200 0:317 0:058
16 − 18 0:000 0:000 0:018 0:036 0:054 0:089 0:804
P/R 0:019 0:049 0:165 0:204 0:272 0:291 0:000
Table 2: transition probabilities, 1956/57-1996/97
obtained 68 points if they had won all their games during the season). Then an
increase in competitive balance sets in, followed by an irregular period with no
clear trends. The picture is slightly dierent for the top 4: a slight upward trend
of the concentration ratio during the eighties and nineties is visible. Despite this
slight upward trend, the value of CR is not high when compared to historical
values of the sixties, contrary to common opinion.
The absolute level of concentration is dicult to interpret. If only because
of sheer luck, a single team will stand out every season. In order to interpret
the scale on the vertical axis, a competition was simulated for every season
under the assumption that every team is of equal quality. This is of course not
realistic, but this provides a reasonable benchmark for the number of points the
best team would obtain because of luck. It turns out that the team nishing
number 1 had more points than expected because of luck in 44% of the seasons.
For the top two combined, this number is 46%, for the top three combined it
is 29%, and nally the total number of points obtained by the best four teams
exceeded in a mere 12% of the seasons the number one would expect because of
luck.
Now we turn to more dynamic measures of competitive balance. As far as
the championship is concerned, the Dutch Premier League is not very balanced:
only four teams have been champions since 1964/65 (three teams if one does
not count AZ that was champion in the season 1980/81 only).
In table 2 we give a matrix with transition probabilities of the ranking in
two consecutive seasons. The ranking in season t is given in the left column
and the ranking in season t + 1 is given in the top row. The entries are the
probabilities of moving from the ranking indicated in the left column in season
t to the ranking indicated in the top row in season t + 1, conditional on the
rank in season t. Hence, the rows sum to 1 (except for rounding errors), the
columns do not. For example, the probability that a team improves from a rank
10, 11, or 12 in season t to a rank 4, 5, or 6 in season t + 1 is 0.100. We see in
table 2 that there is more persistence of ranking in the top than in the middle
and the bottom of the league. The probability that a team remains in the top
three is 0.683, the corresponding probability for a team ending 7{9 is 0.225,
and for a team ending 13{15 only 0.200. In Appendix C we give the transition
probabilities for dierent time periods. The probability that a team remains in
1456/57-96/97 56/57-65/66 66/67-76/77 77/78-87/88 88/89-96/97
1 0:535 0:142 0:400 0:335 0:182
(0:040) (0:107) (0:092) (0:095) (0:104)
obs. 609 133 152 154 124
R2 0:69 0:52 0:81 0:74 0:74
1 0:475 0:047 0:343 0:433 0:202
(0:049) (0:124) (0:117) (0:108) (0:109)
2 0:076 −0:042 −0:024 −0:069 −0:259
(0:049) (0:122) (0:111) (0:107) (0:118)
obs. 522 105 117 122 99
R2 0:68 0:50 0:80 0:76 0:76
1 0:453 −0:070 0:314 0:478 0:106
(0:051) (0:126) (0:123) (0:121) (0:116)
2 0:052 −0:053 0:025 −0:195 −0:241
(0:056) (0:122) (0:118) (0:128) (0:115)
3 0:009 −0:297 −0:217 0:089 −0:258
(0:050) (0:121) (0:116) (0:118) (0:136)
obs. 459 82 92 98 80
R2 0:70 0:62 0:83 0:79 0:82
Table 3: AR-coecients in xed-eects model
the top three varies: it is 0.370 (1956/57-1965/66), 0.767 (1966/67-1975/76),
0.800 (1976/77-1985/86), and 0.758 (1986/87-1996/97). Persistence of quality
has not changed much during the last 30 years.
To examine whether quality is persistent from year to year, we also estimated
the following model6:
it = i + it−1 + it: (5)
Here, it is the quality of team i in year t, etc. A positive estimate for  would
imply that a team that performs well in a given year (compared to its long-time
average) is likely to perform above-average during the next season as well. Only
four teams have a complete history in the premier league: Ajax, Feyenoord,
PSV, and Sparta. They never merged or were relegated. In order to estimate
 we used data of teams that played for at least two consecutive years in the
premier league. This leaves us with 610 observations. The OLS-estimate for  is
6Since we use the estimated 's instead of the true 's we encounter a measurement error
problem in the regressors. We ignore this problem.
150:537 ((0:040);R 2=0 : 677) from which we conclude that one good (better than
average) season is likely to be followed by another better than average season
but that the second season is likely to be inferior to the rst.
It is clear from table 3 that the persistence of quality has diminished over
time: the AR-coecient in the period 66/67-76/77 is 0.400 and it has decreased
to 0.182 for 88/89-96/97. We interpret this as evidence against the hypothesis
that competitive balance has decreased over time. We also experimented with
higher-order AR-models, the results are reported in table 3 as well. As expected,
we nd that the eects of high quality in the past diminishes over time, as can
be seen from the lower estimated coecients for higher lags. In fact, in the
model with two lags estimated for each subperiod, one sees that all estimated
coecients for the second order lags are negative.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed competitive balance in Dutch professional soc-
cer. Using a very simple model to estimate the quality of the teams participat-
ing in the Premier League we have shown that competitive balance decreased
markedly during the second half of the sixties, increased during the rst half
of the seventies and that there has been no clear trend since then. Especially
noteworthy is that the introduction of shirt sponsoring did not lead to any no-
ticeable signicant decrease of balance. Even though competitive balance does
not display any clear year-to-year trend, dynamic analysis shows that top teams
remain top teams.
This paper provides only a starting point for a more structural economic
analysis of competitive balance. The `superstar'-model of Rosen (Rosen (1981))
may provide insight as to why an increase in income inequality that may have
taken place did not lead to a decrease in competitive balance. Another issue
to be resolved is to examine whether the lack of recent trends in competitive
balance is specic to Dutch soccer or whether it is a more international phe-
nomena7.
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17A Estimation Results of the Complete Model
In this Appendix we discuss the construction of our dataset an we give esti-
mation results of the full model. First, in table 4 we give a list of mergers in
professional soccer8. Some teams have played under multiple names. For in-
year new team merged teams
1958 DWS Amsterdam, DWS
1962 Roda JC Roda Sport, Rapid JC
1963 Telstar Stormvogels, VSV
1965 Twente SC Enschede, Enschedese Boys
1967 AZ Alkmaar, Zaanstreek
1967 Den Bosch Den Bosch, Wilhelmina
1967 Xerxes/DHC DHC,X e r x e s
1968 Fortuna SC Fortuna '54, Sittardia
1970 Utrecht Dos, Elinkwijk, Velox
1971 Den Haag ADO, Holland Sport
1972 FC Amsterdam DWS, Blauw Wit
1974 FC Amsterdam FC Amsterdam, De Volenwijckers
1991 Dordrecht '90 Dordrecht '90,S V V
Table 4: Mergers in professional soccer (teams in italics have never played in
the premier league).
stance, FC Dordrecht changed its name in 1979 to DS '79 and in 1990 again
to Dordrecht '90. In other cases, professional soccer teams merged with other
professional soccer teams (for example, in 1991 Dordrecht '90 merged with SVV
to form SVV/Dordrecht '90 which changed its name again in 1992 to become
again Dordrecht '90). We have treated each team that resulted of a merger
as a new team, so we distinguish between DS '79 (a predecessor of Dordrecht
'90 that played premier league in 1987/88) and Dordrecht '90 that resulted of
a merger between with SVV. In the same vein, FC Amsterdam before 1974 is
considered to be a dierent team from FC Amsterdam after that year when it
merged with De Volenwijckers.
In table 5 we give the estimation results of the complete model estimated over
the period 1956{1996. The number of cases is 12155, and the mean loglikelihood
is −0:980507.
8The list is based on information provided in Verkammen and Vermeer (1994).
18team ^  st.dev. team ^  st.dev. team ^  st.dev.
ado 0:322 0:032 fortun54 0:159 0:029 shs −0:546 0:174
ajax 0:951 0:031 fortunsc 0:009 0:022 sittardi −0:212 0:040
alkmaar −0:219 0:043 go ahead 0:057 0:028 sparta 0:262 0:029
amsterda 0:034 0:033 graafsch −0:046 0:030 svv −0:443 0:047
az 0:215 0:032 groninge 0:123 0:021 telstar −0:082 0:033
blauw-wi 0:023 0:031 haarlem −0:032 0:032 twente 0:389 0:028
cambuur −0:297 0:040 heerenve 0:105 0:041 utrecht 0:127 0:023
de graaf −0:446 0:054 helmond −0:446 0:044 veendam −0:255 0:038
den bosc −0:067 0:022 heracles −0:192 0:051 vitesse 0:252 0:031
den haag −0:002 0:025 holland 0:031 0:031 volendam −0:050 0:021
dordrech −0:335 0:050 mvv 0:048 0:032 volewijc −0:353 0:035
dos 0:156 0:019 nac 0:045 0:033 vvv 0:004 0:021
ds79 −0:829 0:113 nec −0:085 0:029 wagening −0:356 0:045
dws 0:141 0:023 noad −0:235 0:040 willem i −0:047 0:022
eindhove −0:283 0:057 pec zwol −0:103 0:041 xerxes 0:212 0:085
elinkwij −0:136 0:051 psv 0:724 0:029 xerxes/d 0:272 0:116
excelsio −0:236 0:039 rapid jc 0:111 0:020 C1 −0:721 0:012
fc amst1 0:280 0:049 rkc 0:107 0:019 C2 0:060 0:010
fc amst2 −0:152 0:026 roda jc 0:267 0:034
Table 5: Estimation results of the full model
19B Parameter Estimates for Ajax, Feyenoord, PSV, and
Sparta
Only four teams have participated in all seasons since the start of professional
soccer in The Netherlands in 1955: Ajax, Feyenoord, PSV, and Sparta. All other
teams have either merged or have been relegated to the rst division during at
least one season. In gure 4 we graph the -parameters of Ajax, Feyenoord,
PSV, and Sparta.
Figure 4: estimates of the 's of Ajax, Feyenoord, PSV, and Sparta
20C Transition probabilities for different periods
A1 − 34 − 67 − 91 0 − 12 13 − 15 16 − 18 P/R
1 − 30 : 370 0:259 0:222 0:037 0:074 0:037 0:000
4 − 60 : 259 0:222 0:222 0:185 0:074 0:037 0:000
7 − 90 : 148 0:222 0:148 0:111 0:259 0:074 0:037
10 − 12 0:111 0:111 0:222 0:296 0:185 0:074 0:000
13 − 15 0:037 0:148 0:074 0:148 0:222 0:185 0:185
16 − 18 0:000 0:000 0:048 0:048 0:000 0:095 0:810
P/R 0:095 0:048 0:095 0:238 0:238 0:286 0:000
B1 − 34 − 67 − 91 0 − 12 13 − 15 16 − 18 P/R
1 − 30 : 767 0:200 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:033
4 − 60 : 167 0:400 0:300 0:033 0:067 0:000 0:033
7 − 90 : 067 0:267 0:200 0:167 0:167 0:100 0:033
10 − 12 0:000 0:067 0:133 0:167 0:333 0:267 0:033
13 − 15 0:000 0:033 0:200 0:267 0:133 0:333 0:033
16 − 18 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:071 0:036 0:143 0:750
P/R 0:000 0:036 0:179 0:321 0:286 0:179 0:000
C1 − 34 − 67 − 91 0 − 12 13 − 15 16 − 18 P/R
1 − 30 : 800 0:167 0:000 0:033 0:000 0:000 0:000
4 − 60 : 167 0:433 0:233 0:100 0:067 0:000 0:000
7 − 90 : 000 0:200 0:133 0:367 0:200 0:100 0:000
10 − 12 0:033 0:100 0:233 0:267 0:133 0:200 0:033
13 − 15 0:000 0:067 0:133 0:100 0:267 0:433 0:000
16 − 18 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:033 0:133 0:033 0:800
P/R 0:000 0:040 0:320 0:120 0:240 0:280 0:000
D1 − 34 − 67 − 91 0 − 12 13 − 15 16 − 18 P/R
1 − 30 : 758 0:212 0:000 0:030 0:000 0:000 0:000
4 − 60 : 121 0:333 0:182 0:182 0:152 0:030 0:000
7 − 90 : 091 0:121 0:273 0:303 0:091 0:121 0:000
10 − 12 0:030 0:121 0:303 0:182 0:273 0:091 0:000
13 − 15 0:000 0:152 0:152 0:182 0:182 0:303 0:030
16 − 18 0:000 0:000 0:030 0:000 0:030 0:091 0:848
P/R 0:000 0:069 0:069 0:138 0:310 0:414 0:000
Table 6: Transition probabilities, 1956/57-1965/66 (A), 1966/67-1975/76 (B),
1976/77-1986/86 (C), and 1986/87-1996/97 (D)
21D A Test for Normality in the Ordered Probit Model
Normality of " was tested for using a Lagrange-Multipliertest, ith the alternative
hypothesis being that the distribution of " belongs to the Pearson family. Other
(than the normal) belonging to the Pearson family are the t-, Gamma-, and
beta-distributions. The test statistic and its properties are discussed at length
in Glewwe (1997) and Weiss (1997). Basically, the test examines whether the
third moment of " is 0, and the fourth moment of " is 3.
The distribution of this test statistic is unknown in nite samples. In order to
get some idea whether the asymptotic approximation is reasonable we performed
a small Monte-Carlo experiment. 10000 samples were drawn according to the
model
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As in the paper, we have i =1 ;:::;18 and j 6= i =1 ;:::;18 so that each
replication consists of 306 observations. The parameters  are xed between
replications and drawn from a U[−1;1] distribution, and c1 is set to −0:7a n d
c 2 = 0. These values for the parameters are typical for those found in the
empirical analysis. A kernel estimate of the distribution of the test statistic
is drawn in gure 5. For comparison, the density function of a 2(2)-random
variable is drawn as well. The two densities do not dier by much in the right
tail, which relevant for our test of normality. However, the 95th and 99th
percentile of the empirical density function are somewhat dierent from their
2(2)-counterparts: they are 5.72 (2(2)0:95 =5 : 99) and 10.95 (2(2)0:99 =
9:21) respectively. The simulated critical values were used to assess normality
in the emprical analysis.
22Figure 5: Simulated distribution of the test statistic for normality
23